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Abstract
Despite its importance, we have a limited understanding of the microeconomics of the interna-
tional transmission of shocks. The conventional wisdom is that relative price changes are the primary
mechanism by which shocks are transmitted across borders. Yet traded-goods prices exhibit signif-
icant inertia in the face of shocks such as exchange-rate changes. This paper quantiﬁes the sources
of this incomplete transmission, that is, this price inertia using the example of the beer market. The
paper addresses two literatures on the sources of local-currency price stability with very dierent
modeling approaches. The empirical trade literature on this topic which includes Goldberg and Ver-
boven (2001) attributes this price inertia to a local-cost component and to ﬁrms’ markup adjustments
but without modeling the role of each of these factors at each stage along a distribution chain. Pa-
pers in the international ﬁnance literature such as Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003), Campa and
Goldberg (2004), and Corsetti and Dedola (2004) attribute local-currency price stability to the share
of local non-traded costs in ﬁnal-goods prices, but do not allow for a role for markup adjustment by
the ﬁrms that incur these costs, whether they be manufacturers or retailers. This paper is the ﬁrst
to quantify the relative importance of these two factors for both manufacturers and retailers in the
incomplete transmission of shocks to prices. The paper documents two basic facts about the trans-
mission of shocks across borders. First, there is a nonlinear relationship between integration at the
microeconomic level (proxied for by market share) and the transmission of shocks to prices; Second, a
local component in manufacturers’ costs explains a large part of the incomplete transmission though
markup adjustments by manufacturers and retailers play a nontrivial role. These facts are analyzed
within the framework of an oligopoly model.
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Despite its importance, we have a limited understanding of the microeconomics of the cross-border
transmission of shocks. The conventional wisdom is that relative price changes are the primary
mechanism by which shocks are transmitted across borders. Yet traded-goods prices exhibit
signiﬁcant inertia in the face of shocks such as exchange-rate changes. This paper quantiﬁes the
sources of this incomplete transmission, that is, this price inertia using the example of the beer
market.
The paper addresses two literatures on the sources of local-currency price stability with very
dierent modeling approaches. The empirical trade literature on this topic, most notably, Gold-
berg and Verboven (2001), attributes this price inertia to a local-cost component and to ﬁrms’
markup adjustments but without modeling the role of each of these factors at each stage along a
distribution chain. Papers in the international ﬁnance literature such as Burstein, Neves, and Re-
belo (2003), Campa and Goldberg (2004), and Corsetti and Dedola (2004) attribute local-currency
price stability to the share of local non-traded costs in ﬁnal-goods prices but do not model markup
adjustments by the ﬁrms that incur these costs, whether they be manufacturers or retailers. This
paper is the ﬁrst to quantify the relative importance of these two factors — non-traded costs and
markup adjustments by manufacturers and retailers — in the incomplete transmission of shocks
to prices.
The paper documents two basic facts about the transmission of shocks across borders. First,
there is a nonlinear relationship between integration at the microeconomic level (proxied for by
market share) and the transmission of shocks to prices; Second, a local component in manufac-
turers’ costs explains a large part of the incomplete transmission though markup adjustments by
manufacturers and retailers play a nontrivial role.
1These facts are analyzed within the framework of an oligopoly model. The paper has two goals:
ﬁrst, to document at the product level when shocks are transmitted across borders; and second, to
identify the sources of their incomplete transmission within the framework of an oligopoly model.
The paper diers from previous work in three ways. First, I model the vertical relationships
between manufacturers and retailers, which enables a richer analysis of the causes of incomplete
transmission than was possible with previous models. Second, I use a product-level analysis to
investigate the causes of incomplete transmission along a distribution chain. Though several re-
cent papers have investigated the role of the distribution chain, and in particular, of a local-cost
component in the incomplete transmission of foreign cost shocks to ﬁnal-goods prices, their work
has relied on aggregate data with their well-known limitations. Third, I use an oligopoly frame-
work that allows me to address questions about the sources of transmission at a microeconomic
level.
I begin my analysis by documenting in reduced-form regressions whether prices are system-
atically related to factors such as exchange-rate ﬂuctuations and the share of local nontraded
costs in ﬁnal-goods prices. I then turn to a more systematic analysis of the sources of incomplete
transmission. I estimate a structural econometric model that links ﬁrms’ pass-through behavior to
strategic interactions with other ﬁrms (supply conditions) and to interactions with consumers (de-
mand conditions). Using the estimated demand system, I conduct counterfactual experiments to
quantify how a foreign cost shock aects domestic and foreign ﬁrms’ proﬁts and consumer surplus.
My general strategy is to estimate brand-level demand and then to use those estimates jointly
with assumptions about ﬁrms’ pricing behavior to recover both retail and manufacturer marginal
costs without observing actual costs. I then use the estimated demand system, assumptions about
ﬁrms’ pricing behavior, and the derived marginal costs to compute the new equilibrium following
2a shock to foreign brands’ marginal costs. I compute the change in ﬁrms’ proﬁt sa n di nc o n s u m e r
surplus using the new equilibrium prices and quantities.
Theoretical work has shown that the response of prices to cost shocks depends on the curvature
of a market’s demand and cost schedules. This implies that any pass-through results may depend
on a model’s functional-form assumptions. I address this issue by estimating a very ﬂexible
demand system and by examining if my parameter estimates are consistent with industry lore
and with price responses to exchange-rate and local-cost ﬂuctuations in reduced-form regressions.
In addition, I empirically test for the best-ﬁt vertical market structure in the beer market in
another paper, Hellerstein (2004), by comparing accounting price-cost margins to the derived
price-cost margins dierent vertical models produce and by using non-nested tests developed
by Villas-Boas (2004). This paper’s empirical analysis focuses on the best-ﬁt vertical market
structure for this industry: A standard linear-pricing model in which manufacturers set wholesale
prices and retailers follow setting retail prices.
I choose to study the beer market for several reasons. First, beer is a good that is fairly
concentrated at the manufacturer level, consistent with my assumption of oligopoly. Because
manufactured goods’ prices tend to exhibit dampened responses to exchange rates in aggregate
data, beer is an appropriate choice to investigate the puzzling phenomenon of incomplete trans-
mission. Second, trade barriers such as voluntary export restraints or antidumping sanctions
that likely distort price-setting behavior in other industries, such as autos or textiles, are rarely
threatened or imposed in this industry. No anti-dumping cases have been brought in the U.S.
beer industry in the past ﬁfteen years, for example. This simpliﬁes the analysis of price inertia.
Third, I have a rich panel data set with monthly retail and wholesale prices for 34 products from
18 manufacturers over 40 months (July 1991-December 1994). It is unusual to observe both
3retail- and wholesale-price data for a single product over time. These data allow me to assess
the validity of my empirical technique, in particular, how well the model captures wholesale-price
movements.
The model’s key identiﬁcation assumption is that over the short run, nominal exchange-rate
ﬂuctuations dwarf other sources of variation in manufacturers’ marginal costs such as input-price
changes. This assumption, though strong, has clear support in the data.1 Figure 1 illustrates
how the exchange rate is much more volatile in monthly data than are brewers’ other typical
marginal costs for the case of Germany.2 The paper presents ﬁgures of the derived exchange rate
that suggest the model captures observed nominal exchange-rate movements fairly well for each
of the sample’s countries. The model assumes that foreign manufacturers incur marginal costs
in foreign currencies to brew, bottle, and ship their beer. They observe the realized value of the
nominal exchange rate before setting their prices in the domestic currency and they assume any
exchange-rate change is exogenous and permanent over the sample period of one month.3
The counterfactual experiments produce ﬁve major results. First, there is a nonlinear rela-
tionship between integration at the microeconomic level and the transmission of shocks to prices;
Second, a local component in manufacturers’ costs explains a large part of the incomplete trans-
mission though markup adjustments by manufacturers and the retailer play a nontrivial role,
accounting for 26 percent of the incomplete transmission following a 5-percent exchange-rate
depreciation, and 37 percent following a 5-percent exchange-rate appreciation. Third, foreign
1The breakdown of the Bretton-Woods ﬁxed exchange-rate system in 1973 led to a permanent three-fold to
nine-fold increase in nominal exchange-rate volatility. Meanwhile such fundamentals as real output, interest rates,
or consumer prices showed no corresponding rise in volatility.
2This assumption is particularly valid for the beer industry which integrated backward starting in the late 1970s.
By the early 1990s, most brewers purchased their agricultural inputs through long-term contracts with farmers which
insulated them from short-run price ﬂuctuations. Most brewers also manufactured their own packaging including
labels, bottles, and cans. Some even integrated backward with respect to energy: In the late 1970s, Adolph Coors
purchased and developed a coalﬁeld to supply its plants as described in Ghemawat (1992).
3This assumption is consistent with the stylized fact identiﬁed by Meese and Rogo (1983) that the best short-
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Figure 1: The nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuates by more than do typical input prices for German
brewers. Each series is normalized to 1 in January 1991. Monthly data. Sources: BLS,U . S .
Department of Labor; Eurostat; International Financial Statistics, IMF.
manufacturers generally bear more of the social-welfare costs (or reap more of the social-welfare
beneﬁts) of a change in the nominal exchange rate than do consumers or domestic ﬁrms. Follow-
ing a 5-percent depreciation, domestic manufacturer proﬁts rise by 0.1 percent while consumer
surplus falls by 4.2 percent, retailer proﬁts by 2.1 percent, and foreign manufacturer proﬁts by 6
percent. Fourth, previous work on cross-border transmission did not model the retailer’s pricing
decision, and thus implicitly assumed that manufacturers’ interactions with downstream ﬁrms did
not matter. My ﬁndings suggest that the retailer plays an important role by absorbing part of an
exchange-rate-induced marginal-cost shock before it reaches consumers. The retailer’s markups
on foreign brands are more than twice the size of its markups on domestic brands: It may re-
gard these higher markups as compensation for their greater ﬂuctuation over time. Finally, the
results suggest some strategic interaction between domestic and foreign manufacturers following
an exchange-rate shock, one possible explanation for the incomplete transmission. After a depre-
5ciation, for example, domestic manufacturers with brands that are close substitutes for foreign
brands increase their proﬁts by cutting prices to take market share from foreign manufacturers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the market and data
along with some preliminary descriptive results. Section 3 sets out the theoretical model, and
section 4 the estimation methodology. Results from the random-coe!cients demand model are
reported in section 5, and the results of the counterfactual experiments in section 6.
2T h e M a r k e t a n d t h e D a t a
In this section I describe the market my data cover. I then present summary statistics for the
data and some preliminary descriptive results.
2.1 Market
As recently as 1970, imported beers made up less than one percent of total U.S. beer consumption.
Consumption of imported brands grew slowly in the 1980s and by double digits for each year in
the 1990s resulting in a market share of over seven percent by the end of the decade. Despite
these changes, the U.S. beer industry remains quite concentrated at the manufacturer level. The
three largest domestic brewers Anheuser-Busch (45%), Adolph Coors (10%), and Miller Brewing
(23%) together account for roughly 80 percent of U.S. beer sales.
Beer is an example of one type of imported good: packaged goods imported for consumption.
Such imports do not require any further manufacture before reaching consumers and make up
roughly half of the non-oil imports to the U.S. over the sample period. Beer shipments in my
data are handled by independent wholesale distributors. The model abstracts from this additional
step in the vertical chain, as the brewers set their distributors’ prices through a practice known as
6resale price maintenance and cover a signiﬁcant portion of their distributors’ marginal costs. This
practice makes the analysis of pricing behavior along the distribution chain relatively straight-
forward.
During the 1990s supermarkets increased the selection of beers they oered as well as the
total shelf space devoted to beer. A study from this period found that beer was the tenth most
frequently purchased item and the seventh most proﬁtable item for the average U.S. supermarket.4
Supermarkets sell approximately 20 percent of all beer consumed in the U.S. As my data focus
on one metropolitan statistical area, I do not need to control for variation in retail alcohol sales
regulations. Such regulations can dier considerably across states.
2.2 Data
My data come from Dominick’s Finer Foods, the second-largest supermarket chain in the Chicago
metropolitan area in the mid 1990s with a market share of roughly 20 percent. I have a rich
scanner data set that records retail prices for each product sold by Dominick’s over a period of
four years. They were gathered by the Kilts Center for Marketing at the University of Chicago
and include aggregate retail volume market shares and retail prices for 34 brands produced by
18 manufacturers. Summary statistics for prices, servings sold, and volume market shares are
provided in Table 1. Of the chain’s 88 stores, I include only those that report prices for the full
sample period. My data contain roughly two-thirds (56) of the chain’s stores.
I aggregate data from each Dominick’s store into one of three price zones. These zones are
deﬁned by Dominick’s mainly on the basis of customer demographics. Although they do not
report these zones, I was able to identify them through zip-code level demographics (with a few
4Canadian Trade Commissioner (2000).
7exceptions, each Dominick’s s t o r ei nm ys a m p l ei st h eo n l ys t o r el o c a t e di ni t sz i pc o d e )a n db y
comparing the average prices charged for the same product across stores. I classify each store
according to its pricing behavior as a low-, medium-, or high-price store. I then aggregate sales
across the stores in each pricing zone. This aggregation procedure retains some cross-sectional
variation in the data which is helpful for the demand estimation. Residents’ income covaries
positively with retail prices across the three zones.
Id e ﬁne a product as one twelve-ounce serving of a brand of beer. Quantity is the total number
of servings sold per month. I deﬁne a market as one of Dominick’s price zones in one month.
Products’ market shares are calculated with respect to the potential market which is deﬁned as the
total beer purchased in supermarkets by the residents of the zip codes in which each Dominick’s
store is located. During this period, the annual per-capita consumption of beer in the U.S. was
22.6 gallons. This implies the potential market for total beer consumption to be 20 servings per
capita per month in each pricing zone, that is: 1 gallon=128 ounces, so
(22=6W128)
12W12 =2 0 =1 servings
per month. The potential market for beer sold in supermarkets is 20 percent of the total potential
market for beer sales. Each adult consumes on average 4 servings per month that were purchased
at a supermarket. So the potential market of beer servings sold in supermarkets is 4 multiplied
by the resident adult population in each pricing zone.
Id e ﬁne the outside good to be all beer sold by other supermarkets to residents of the same
zip codes as well as all beer sales in the sample’s Dominick’s stores not already included in my
sample. These Dominick’s sales mainly consist of microbrewery or other specialty brands, each
with a relatively small market share. The share of Dominick’s total revenue from beer sales
included in my sample is high, with a mean of 65 percent. The combined volume market share of
products covered in the sample with respect to the potential market is, on average, 18.5 percent.
8Promotions occur infrequently in the Dominick’s data. Bonus-buy sales appear to be the most
common promotion used for beer which appear in the data as price reductions.
I supplement the Dominick’s data with information on manufacturer costs, product charac-
teristics, advertising, and the distribution of consumer demographics. Product characteristics
come from the ratings of a Consumer Reports study conducted in 1996. Table 2 reports summary
statistics for the following characteristics: percent alcohol, calories, bitterness, maltiness, hops,
sulfury, fruity, and ﬂoral.
2.3 Preliminary Descriptive Results
I begin my analysis by documenting in reduced-form regressions whether Dominick’s beer prices
are systematically related to movements in bilateral nominal exchange-rates. I estimate the fol-
lowing basic price equation:
(1) lnsu
mw = lnemw +  lnwg
mw +  lnz
i
mw +  lnImw + %mw
where the subscripts j and t refer to product j in market t where a market is deﬁned as a
month and price-zone pair, pu is the product’s retail price, wg is local wages, e is the bilateral
nominal exchange rate, zi is foreign wages, I is a dummy for a brand-speciﬁcp r o m o t i o n ,a n d%
is a random error term. The wage variables control for marginal-cost shocks and the promotion
variable for demand shocks that may aect a brand’s retail price. Note that the nominal exchange
rate may be an endogenous variable in this equation: The error term may contain domestic supply
and demand shocks that aect both domestic retail prices and the bilateral exchange rate. This
potential endogeneity problem is dealt with statistically through the use of instrumental variables.
To my knowledge, no empirical study of pass-through addresses the econometric issue of
9exchange-rate endogeneity. The literature’s partial-equilibrium studies assume exchange-rate ﬂuc-
tuations to be exogenous with respect to domestic prices. Even if a ﬁrm treats the exchange rate
as exogenous, however, in reality it may be endogenous. A valid instrument in this case will
be correlated with the exchange rate but not with macroeconomic disturbances in the U.S. that
could aect both the exchange rate and an imported beer’s retail price.
I estimate pass-through elasticities using foreign interest rates as instruments. The idea behind
the instrument is to exploit the fact that interest-rate dierentials are poor short-run predictors
of exchange-rate movements (Krugman and Obstfeld 2000). This implies that the short-run
determinants of foreign interest rates should be su!ciently independent of the domestic economy
to serve as an instrument for exchange-rate endogeneity. Those supply and demand shocks that
aect both domestic prices and the bilateral exchange rate should not be correlated with those
shocks that primarily aect foreign interest rates in the short run.
Table 3 reports results from estimating the pricing equation. The ﬁrst column reports coef-
ﬁcients from an OLS regression of the price on the exchange rate alone, the second column the
coe!cients from an OLS estimation of equation (1), and the third column the coe!cients from
an instrumental variables (IV) estimation of equation (1)= The exchange rate has a small but
signiﬁcant relationship to the retail price of about 1 percent in the OLS results. In the IV results,
the share of variation in the retail price attributed to movements in the exchange rate is 6 percent.
The partial F-statistic from the ﬁrst-stage regression, at 44.85, is signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level
which suggests that the instrument may have some power. Table 16 in the appendix reports the
ﬁrst-stage results.
103M o d e l
This section describes the supply model and derives simple expressions to compute pass-through
coe!cients and to decompose the sources of local-currency price rigidity between manufacturers’
and retailers’ nontraded costs and markup adjustments. It then sets out the random-coe!cients
model used to estimate demand.
3.1 Supply
Consider the standard linear-pricing model that leads to double-marginalization in which man-
ufacturers, acting as Bertrand oligopolists with dierentiated products, set their prices ﬁrst and
retailers then set their prices taking the wholesale prices they observe as given. Thus, a double
margin is added to the marginal cost to produce the product. Strategic interactions between
manufacturers and retailers with respect to prices follow a sequential Nash model. To solve the
model, one uses backwards induction and solves the retailer’s problem ﬁrst.
3.1.1 Retailer
Consider a retail ﬁrm that sells all of the market’s J dierentiated products. Let all ﬁrms use















mw is the price the retailer sets for product j, pz
mw is the wholesale price paid by the retailer
for product j, ntcu
mw are destination-market nontraded costs paid by the retailer to sell product
j> and smw(p
u
w) is the quantity demanded of product j which is a function of the prices of all J
11products. Assuming that the retailer acts as a proﬁt maximizer, the retail price su
mw must satisfy
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mw m>n =1 >===>J=> and a J × J matrix uw called the retailer reaction matrix with
the jth, kth element equal to Vmn , the marginal change in the kth product’s market share given
a change in the jth product’s retail price. The stacked ﬁrst-order conditions can be rewritten in
vector notation:










where the retail price for product j in market t will be the sum of its wholesale price, non-traded
costs, and markup.
3.1.2 Manufacturers
Let there be M manufacturers that each produce some subset pw of the market’s Jw dierentiated
products. Each manufacturer chooses its wholesale price pz
mw while assuming the retailer behaves















mw are traded costs and ntcz
mw are destination-market nontraded costs incurred by the man-
ufacturer to produce and sell product j.5 Multiproduct ﬁrms are represented by a manufacturer
ownership matrix, Tz, with elements Tz (m>n)=1 if both products j and k are produced by
the same manufacturer, and zero otherwise. Assuming a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices and
that all manufacturers act as proﬁt maximizers, the wholesale price sz












=0for m =1 >2>===>M w=
This gives us another set of J equations, one for each product. Let zw be the manufacturer’s





mw > the change in each product’s share with respect to a
change in each product’s traded marginal cost to the manufacturer. The manufacturer’s reaction
matrix is a transformation of the retailer’s reaction matrix: zw = 0
swuw where sw is a J-by-J
matrix of the partial derivative of each retail price with respect to each product’s wholesale price.
Each column of sw contains the entries of a response matrix computed without observing the
retailer’s marginal costs. The properties of this manufacturer response matrix are described in
greater detail in Villas-Boas (2004) and Villas-Boas and Hellerstein (2004). To obtain expressions
for this matrix, one uses the implicit-function theorem to totally dierentiate the retailer’s ﬁrst-
5Nontraded costs incurred by the manufacturer in its home country are treated as part of its traded costs. As
such nontraded costs will be denominated in the home country’s currency, they will be subject to shocks caused by
variation in the nominal exchange rate which nontraded costs incurred in the destination market will not.
13order condition for product m with respect to all retail prices (gsu
n>n=1 >==>Q) a n dw i t hr e s p e c t
to the manufacturer’s price pz








































Let Y be a matrix with general element y(m>n) and Z be an N-dimensional vector with general
element z(m>i).T h e n Yg s u  Zigsz
i =0 = One can solve for the derivatives of all retail prices





Stacking the Q columns together gives z = Y 31Zi which gives the derivatives of all retail




l = The (jth,
kth) entry in sw is then the partial derivative of the kth product’s retail price with respect to the
mth product’s wholesale price for that market. The (jth, kth) element of zw is the sum of the
eect of the jth product’s retail marginal costs on each of the J products’ retail prices which in









mw for m = 1>2>===J=
The manufacturers’ marginal costs are then recovered by inverting the multiproduct manu-




w +( zw  Wz)
31 vw
where for product j in market t the wholesale price is the sum of the manufacturer traded costs,
nontraded costs, and markup function. The manufacturer of product j can use its estimate of the
14retailer’s nontraded costs and reaction function to compute how a change in the manufacturer
price will aect the retailer price for its product. Manufacturers can assess the impact on the
vertical proﬁt, the size of the pie, as well as its share of the pie by considering the retailer reaction
function before choosing a price. Manufacturers may also act strategically with respect to one
another. The retailer mediates these interactions by its pass-through of a given manufacturer’s
price change to the product’s retail price. Manufacturers set prices after considering the nontraded
costs the retailer must incur, the retailer’s pass-through of any manufacturer price changes to the
retail price, and other manufacturers’ and consumers’ reactions to any retail-price changes.
3.1.3 Counterfactual Experiments: Pass-Through Coe!cients
To recover pass-through coe!cients I estimate the eect of a shock to foreign ﬁrms’ marginal
costs on all ﬁrms’ wholesale and retail prices by computing a new Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
Suppose a shock hits the traded component of the jth product’s marginal cost. To compute the
manufacturer pass-through, one substitutes the new vector of traded marginal costs, tczW
w > into
the system of J nonlinear equations that characterize manufacturer pricing behavior, and then
searches for the wholesale price vector pzW
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l I totally dierentiate
the manufacturer’s ﬁrst-order condition for product m with respect to all manufacturer prices
15(gsz
n >n=1 >==>Q) and with respect to the traded marginal cost tcz






































Let \ be a matrix with general element |(m>n) and ] be an Q-dimensional vector with general
element }(m>i).T h e n\g s z]igwfz
i =0 = One can solve for the derivatives of all wholesale prices





Stacking the Q columns together gives the matrix z = \ 31] which computes the derivatives







To compute pass-through at the retail level, one substitutes the derived values of the vector pzW
w
into the system of J nonlinear equations for the retail ﬁrm, and then searches for the retail price
vector puW








31 vnw for m>n =1 >2>===>M w=









l > as described in the previous section. Retail-traded pass-through, deﬁned as pass-

























for a simple model
with single-product ﬁrms.
3.2.1 Simple Model: Single-Product Manufacturers
Consider a simple model of single-product manufacturers each selling to single-product retailers.
One can compute the product j’s wholesale pass-through elasticity by using the implicit-function
theorem to take the total derivative of pz
mw with respect to tcz







































































mw= Equation (14) shows
that it is determined by the jth good’s markup, that is, its market share vmw divided by the
slope of the derived demand curve with respect to the wholesale price,
Cvmw
Csz
mw> the curvature of





























































When the derived demand
























= As a product’s curvature coe!cient or its markup rises, manufacturer pass-
through falls if the second derivative is negative. As the ratio of the product’s wholesale price to
its traded marginal costs rises, manufacturer pass-through also falls.
3.2.2 Simple Model: Single-Product Retailer
Assuming the retailer’s nontraded marginal costs qwfu
mw vary independently of the wholesale price,

















































Retail pass-through, deﬁned as pass-through by the retailer of just those costs passed on by












mw= Equation (16) shows that it is determined by the
jth good’s markup, that is, its market share vmw divided by the slope of the demand curve with
respect to the retail price,
Cvmw
Csu
mw> the curvature of the demand curve with respect to the retail










mw =When demand is linear, so g2vw










































= As the markup or the curvature coe!cient rises, pass-through




mw rises, pass-through falls. Finally, retail traded-goods pass-through, deﬁned as pass-through






















The pass-through computations done with the Bertrand-Nash supply model require consistent es-
timates of demand. Market demand is derived from a standard discrete-choice model of consumer
behavior that follows the work of Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and Nevo
(2001) among others. I use a random-coe!cients logit model to estimate the demand system, as it
is a very ﬂexible and general model. The pass-through coe!cients’ accuracy depends in particular
on consistent estimation of the curvature of the demand curve, that is, of the second derivative
of the demand equation. The random-coe!cients model imposes very few restrictions on the
demand system’s own- and cross-price elasticities. This ﬂexibility makes it the most appropriate
model to study pass-through in this market.6
Suppose consumer i chooses to purchase one unit of good j if and only if the utility from
consuming that good is as great as the utility from consuming any other good. Consumer utility
depends on product characteristics and individual taste parameters: product-level market shares
are derived as the aggregate outcome of individual consumer decisions. All the parameters of the
demand system can be estimated from product-level data, that is, from product prices, quantities,
6Other possible demand models such as the multistage budgeting model or the nested logit model do not ﬁt
this market particularly well. It is di!cult to deﬁne clear nests or stages in beer consumption because of the high
cross-price elasticities between domestic light beers and foreign light and regular beers. When a consumer chooses
to drink a light beer that also is an import, it is not clear if he categorized beers primarily as domestic or imported
and secondarily as light or regular, or vice versa.
19and characteristics.
Suppose we observe t=1>===>T markets. Let the indirect utility for consumer i in consuming
product j in market t take a quasi-linear form:
(17) xlmw = {mw  smw + mw + %lmw = Ylmw + %lmw>l =1 >===>L=> m =1 >===>M=> w =1 >===>W=
where %lmw is a mean-zero stochastic term= A consumer’s utility from consuming a given product
is a function of a vector of individual characteristics  and a vector of product characteristics
(x>>p)w h e r ep are product prices, x are product characteristics observed by the econometrician,
the consumer, and the producer, and  are product characteristics observed by the producer and
consumer but not by the econometrician. Let the taste for certain product characteristics vary











+ Gl + 	yl
where Dl is a vector of demographics for consumer i,  is a matrix of coe!cients that characterize
how consumer tastes vary with demographics, vl is a vector of unobserved characteristics for
consumer i,a n d	 is a matrix of coe!cients that characterizes how consumer tastes vary with
their unobserved characteristics. I assume that, conditional on demographics, the distribution
of consumers’ unobserved characteristics is multivariate normal. The demographic draws give
an empirical distribution for the observed consumer characteristics Gl= Indirect utility can be
redeﬁned in terms of mean utility mw= xmwpmw+mw and deviations (in vector notation) from
that mean lmw=[ Gl 	yl]  [smw {mw]:
20(19) xlmw = mw + lmw + %lmw
Finally, consumers have the option of an outside good. Consumer i can choose not to purchase
one of the products in the sample. The price of the outside good is assumed to be set independently
of the prices observed in the sample.7 The mean utility of the outside good is normalized to be
zero and constant over markets. The indirect utility from choosing to consume the outside good
is:
(20) xl0w = 
0w + 0Gl + 0yl0 + %l0w
Let Am be the set of consumer traits that induce purchase of good j. The market share of good j





where PW(d) is the density of consumer characteristics  =[G ] in the population. To compute
this integral, one must make assumptions about the distribution of consumer characteristics. I
report estimates from two models. For diagnostic purposes, I initially restrict heterogeneity in
7As the manufacturers I observe supply their products to the outside market, this assumption may be problematic
given my data. Recent empirical work shows that consumers rarely search over several local supermarkets to locate
the lowest price for a single good. This implies that beer in other supermarkets (the outside good in my model) is
unlikely to be priced to respond in the short run (over the course of a month) to the prices set by Dominick’s.A n y
distortions introduced by this assumption are likely to be second order. The inclusion of an outside good means
my use of a single retailer does not require an assumption of monopoly in the retail market. It makes the estimates
of pass-through more credible given that the retail ﬁrm in my sample is constrained by the availability of goods
other than those it sells. Even if the price of the outside good does not respond to price changes in the sample, it
remains a potential choice for consumers when faced with a price increase for products in the sample.
21consumer tastes to enter only through the random shock %lmw which is independently and identically
distributed with a Type I extreme-value distribution. For this model, the probability of individual






where mw is the mean utility common to all consumers and Jw remains the total number of products
in the market at time t.
In the full random-coe!cients model, I assume %lmw is i.i.d with a Type I extreme-value distri-
bution but now allow heterogeneity in consumer preferences to enter through an additional term
lw. This allows more general substitution patterns among products than is permitted under the
restrictions of the multinomial logit model. The probability of individual i purchasing product
j in market t must now be computed by simulation. This probability is given by computing the








The integral is approximated by the smooth simulator which, given a set of N draws from the










Given these predicted market shares, I search for demand parameters that implicitly minimize the
distance between these predicted market shares and the observed market shares using a generalized
22method-of-moments (GMM) procedure, as I discuss in further detail in the estimation section.
3.4 Discussion
Before turning to the estimation procedures, it may be useful to explain how the model can be
used to identify the sources of traded-goods price inertia as well as its limitations. The pricing
equations (10) and (12) decompose each brand’s price into six components: the manufacturer’s
and retailer’s markups and traded and nontraded marginal costs. Following a change in ﬁrms’
traded marginal costs, price inertia that cannot be explained by the presence of local non-traded
costs implies markup adjustment.
I use a reduced-form estimation to identify the share of the local nontraded costs in each
product’s retail price. Following Goldberg and Verboven (2001), I estimate the following basic
price equation:
(25) lnsu
mwemw =  lnwg
mwemw +  lnz
i
mw + %mw
where the subscripts j and t refer to product j in market t where a market is deﬁned as a
month and price-zone pair, pu is the product’s retail price, wg is local wages, e is the bilateral
nominal exchange rate, zi is foreign wages, and % is a random error term. Local wages are hourly
compensation in local currency terms for the grocery sector in Illinois multiplied by the exchange
rate which is foreign currency units per unit of domestic currency. The dependent variable is the
retail price for each brand multiplied by the exchange rate which is foreign currency units per
unit of domestic currency. The regression also includes brand dummy variables. Table 4’s results
indicate that the share of variation in the retail price attributed to movements in local costs is
between 82 and 85 percent, depending on the control variables used. Splitting the dierence
23between the two regression results, I calibrate the model so that 83.5 percent of the retail price’s
movement will be attributable to the presence of nontraded local costs.
4 Estimation
This section describes the econometric procedures used to estimate the model’s demand parame-
ters.
4.1 Demand
The results depend on consistent estimates of the model’s demand parameters. Two issues arise in
estimating a complete demand system in an oligopolistic market with dierentiated products: the
high dimensionality of elasticities to estimate and the potential endogeneity of price.8 Following
McFadden (1973), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and Nevo (2001) I draw on the discrete-
choice literature to address the ﬁrst issue: I project the products onto a characteristics space with
a much smaller dimension than the number of products. The second issue is that a product’s price
may be correlated with changes in its unobserved characteristics. I deal with this second issue
by instrumenting for the potential endogeneity of price. Following Villas-Boas (2004), I use input
prices interacted with product ﬁxed eects as instruments. Input prices should be correlated with
those aspects of price that aect consumer demand but are not themselves aected by consumer
demand, that is, with supply shocks.
I estimate the demand parameters by following the algorithm proposed by Berry (1994). This
algorithm uses a nonlinear generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) procedure. The main step
in the estimation is to construct a moment condition that interacts instrumental variables and
8In an oligopolistic market with dierentiated products, the number of parameters to be estimated is proportional
to the square of the number of products, which creates a dimensionality problem given a large number of products.
24a structural error term to form a nonlinear GMM estimator. Let  signify the demand-side
parameters to be estimated with 1 denoting the model’s linear parameters and 2 its non-linear
parameters. I compute the structural error term as a function of the data and demand parameters
by solving for the mean utility levels (across the individuals sampled) that solve the implicit system
of equations:
(26) vw ({w>s w>w|2)=Vw
where Vw are the observed market shares and vw ({w>s w=w|2) is the market-share function deﬁned
in equation (24). For the logit model, this is given by the dierence between the log of a product’s
observed market share and the log of the outside good’s observed market share: mw =l o g ( Vmw) 
log(V0w). For the full random-coe!cients model, it is computed by simulation.9
Following this inversion, one relates the recovered mean utility from consuming product j in
market t to its price, pmw, its constant observed and unobserved product characteristics, dm> and
the error term mw which now contains changes in unobserved product characteristics:
(27) mw = mw  mgm  smw
Iu s eb r a n dﬁxed eects as product characteristics following Nevo (2001). The product ﬁxed
eects dm proxy for the observed characteristics term xm in equation (17) and mean unobserved
characteristics. The mean utility term here denotes the part of the indirect utility expression in
equation (19) that does not vary across consumers.
9See Nevo (2000) for details.
254.2 Instruments
The moment condition discussed above requires an instrument that is correlated with product-level
prices pmw but not with changes in unobserved product characteristics mw to achieve identiﬁcation
of the model. While I observe national promotional activity by brand, I do not observe local pro-
motional activity. It follows that the residual mw likely contains changes in products’ perceived
characteristics that are stimulated by local promotional activity. For example, an increase in the
mean utility from consuming product j caused by a rise in product j’s unobserved promotional
activity should cause a rightward shift in product j’s demand curve and, thus, a rise in its retail
price. Therefore, the residual will be correlated with the price and (nonlinear) least squares will
yield inconsistent estimates. The solution to this endogeneity problem is to introduce a set of j
instrumental variables zmw that are orthogonal to the error term mw of interest. The population
moment condition requires that the variables zmw be orthogonal to those unobserved changes in
product characteristics stimulated by local advertising.
I use the prices of inputs to the brewing process as instruments. Input prices should be
correlated with the retail price, which aects consumer demand, but are not themselves correlated
with changes in unobserved characteristics that enter the consumer demand. Input prices like
wages are unlikely to have any relationship to the types of promotional activity that will stimulate
perceived changes in the characteristics of the sample’s products. My instruments are hourly
compensation in local currency terms for production workers in Food, Beverage and Tobacco
Manufacturing Industries. These annual ﬁgures come from the Foreign Labor Statistics Program
of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bilateral nominal exchange rates
account for some of the variation in these data. The model’s identiﬁcation of monthly variation
in nominal exchange-rates should not be aected, however, given the time mismatch between my
26instrument data (which are annual) and my price data (which are monthly). I interact the hourly
compensation variables, which vary by country and year, with indicator variables for each brand.
This allows each product’s price to respond independently to a given supply shock.
One might expect foreign wages to be weakly correlated with domestic retail prices, thus
generating a weak instrumental-variables problem.10 Given the well-known border eect on prices
we should expect a somewhat weaker relationship between wages and prices for foreign products
than for domestic products.11 The model’s ﬁrst-stage results, reported in table 15 in the appendix,
indicate that foreign products’ input prices appear to be eective as instruments.
Manufacturer cost data for use as instruments come from the U.S. Department of Labor’s For-
eign Labor Statistics Program. The joint distribution of each pricing zone’s residents with respect
to age and income comes from the 1990 U.S. Census. To construct appropriate demographics for
each pricing zone, I collected a sample of the joint distribution of residents’ age and income for
each zip code in which a Dominick’s store was located. I then aggregate the data across each
pricing zone to get one set of demographics for each zone.
5R e s u l t s
This section presents results from the estimation of the model. It ﬁrst discusses results from the
estimation of the demand system. It then examines how well the derived markups and marginal
costs reﬂect stylized facts for the beer market.
10Staiger and Stock (1997) examine the properties of the IV estimator in the presence of weak instruments.
11Engel and Rogers (1996) examine the persistent deviations from the law of one price across national borders.
275.1 Demand Estimation: Logit Demand
Table 5 reports results from estimation of demand using the multinomial logit model. Due to
its restrictive functional form, this model will not produce credible estimates of pass-through.
However, it is helpful to see how well the instruments for price perform in the logit demand
estimation before turning to the full random-coe!cients model. Table 15 in the appendix reports
the ﬁrst-stage results for demand. Most of the coe!cients have the expected sign: as hourly
compensation increases, the retail price of each product should increase. T-statistics calculated
using Huber-White robust standard errors indicate that most of the coe!cients are signiﬁcant
at the 5-percent level. The negative coe!cients on some variables likely result from collinearity
between some of the regressors.
Table 5 suggests the instruments may have some power. The ﬁrst-stage F-test of the instru-
ments, at 17.42, is signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level. The consumer’s sensitivity to price should
increase after I instrument for unobserved changes in characteristics. That is, consumers should
appear more sensitive to price once I instrument for the impact of unobserved (by the econometri-
cian, not by ﬁrms or consumers) changes in product characteristics on their consumption choices.
It is promising that the price coe!cient falls from -5.62 in the OLS estimation to -8.34 in the IV
estimation. The second and fourth columns of Table 5 include brand-level national advertising
expenditure in the estimation. Although signed as expected, at .17 in the OLS estimation and
.16 in the IV estimation, the advertising coe!cient is highly insigniﬁcant. The brand-level ﬁxed
eects likely capture those aspects of consumer taste that are stimulated by national advertising.
The Hausman exogeneity test for the price variable, at 10.28, is signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level.
A Hausman test of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject this speciﬁcation. It returns a value
of 11.56, far below the critical value of 45 that must be surpassed to fail the test.
285.2 Demand: Random-Coe!cients Model
Table 6 reports results from estimation of the demand equation (27). I allow consumers’ age
and income to interact with their taste coe!cients for price and percent alcohol. As I esti-
mate the demand equation using product ﬁxed eects, I recover the consumer taste coe!cients
in a generalized-least-squares regression of the estimated product ﬁxed eects on product char-
acteristics. This GLS regression assumes changes in brands’ unobserved characteristics  are
independent of changes in brands’ observed characteristics {: H (|{)=0 =
The coe!cients on the characteristics appear reasonable. As consumers’ age and income rise,
they become less price sensitive. The coe!cients on age, at 3.16, and on income, at .28, are
signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level. The mean preference in the population is in favor of a bitter
and hoppy taste in beer. Both characteristics have positive and highly signiﬁcant coe!cients.
The mean preference in the population is quite averse to sweet, fruity, or malty ﬂavors in beer.
All three have negative coe!cients, with the ﬁrst two highly signiﬁcant. As the percent alcohol
rises, the mean utility in the population falls. This result appears reasonable once one considers
that identiﬁcation here comes from the variation in the percent alcohol between light and regular
beers. As light beers sell at a premium, there clearly is some gain in utility from less alcohol within
a given range. I do not consider nonalcoholic beers in this sample, so the choice of no alcohol is
not reﬂe c t e di nt h i sc o e !cient. Calories have a negative sign, as one would expect, though the
coe!cient is not signiﬁcant. Finally, an indicator variable for poor quality, the ”Sulfury/Skunky”
characteristic, has a large, negative, and highly signiﬁcant coe!cient as one would expect. The
minimum-distance weighted R2 is .46 indicating these characteristics explain the variation in the
estimated product ﬁxed eects fairly well.
Table 7 reports a sample of the median own- and cross-price elasticities for selected brands.
29The cross-price elasticities are generally intuitive. The cross-price elasticities are higher between
imported brands than between imported and domestic brands. A change in the price of Amstel,
from Holland, has a greater impact on the market share of other imported brands such as Heineken
at .0168 or Beck’s at .0162 than on such domestic brands as Miller High Life at .0054. The cross-
price elasticities between a domestic premium light beer such as Bud Light a n da ni m p o r ts u c h
as Beck’s at .1005 or Corona at .0986 are somewhat higher than those between Bud Light and
the domestic brands Bud at .0853 or Miller High Life at .0827.
Table 8 reports retail prices and derived markups for selected brands. Foreign brands’ median
retail price of one dollar for foreign brands is about twice that of domestic brands, at 49 cents,
which is consistent with industry lore.12 The median retail markup for domestic brands is 12
cents while for imported brands it is over twice that at 29 cents. Markups at the manufacturer
level are somewhat lower: the median domestic markup is 9 cents and the median foreign markup
is 20 cents. Markups are generally higher for light beers than for regular beers, also consistent
with the market’s stylized facts.
Figure 2 compares the observed and derived exchange rates over the sample period for most of
the countries in the sample. The derived exchange rates are 12-month moving averages to remove
seasonal ﬂuctuations. The high covariance between the two variables suggests the structural
model identiﬁes nominal exchange-rate movements fairly well for each of the sample’s countries.
The model’s derived wholesale prices also appear to follow observed wholesale-price movements
fairly closely: the correlation between the two series is over 86 percent across all brands, zones,
and months.
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Using the full random-coe!cients model and the derived marginal costs I conduct counterfactual
experiments to analyze how ﬁrms and consumers react to foreign shocks. This section presents
and discusses the results from these experiments.
The ﬁrst counterfactual experiments consider how foreign manufacturers and the retailer
adjust their prices following a ﬁve-percent increase in foreign ﬁrms’ marginal costs due to an
exchange-rate depreciation. The ﬁrst column of Table 9 reports manufacturer-traded pass-through:
the incomplete pass-through of the original shock to the wholesale price due to manufacturer
markup adjustment. The second column reports retail-nontraded pass-through: the incomplete
pass-through of the original shock to the retail price due to the presence of a local component in
retail costs. The last column reports the retail-traded pass-through: the incomplete pass-through
of the original shock to the retail price due to retailer markup adjustment. The model is cal-
ibrated so that the manufacturer-nontraded pass-through, the incomplete pass-through of the
original shock to the wholesale price due to the presence of a local component in manufacturer
costs, is 50 percent, drawing on industry lore and on the estimation results from section 4.
I ﬁnd some variation in ﬁrms’ pass-through across brands. The median manufacturer-traded
pass-through of a 5-percent depreciation ranges from 5 percent for Grolsch to 66 percent for
Corona: It is 35 percent across all brands. The retailer’s median non-traded pass-through elas-
ticity is 16 percent and its traded pass-through elasticity is 9 percent. Pass-through elasticities
following a 5-percent appreciation are lower than those following a depreciation: The median
manufacturer-traded, retail-nontraded, and retail-traded pass-through elasticities are 16, 8, and
7 percent, respectively.
The results are generally consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model discussed
32in section 3. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the nonlinear relationship between integration at the
microeconomic level, proxied for by market share, and the transmission of shocks to prices. The
ﬁgures display scatterplots with each brand’s median share of imported brands’ total sales on
the X-axis and manufacturer traded, retail nontraded, and retail traded pass-through elasticities
on the Y-axis. Figure 3 shows that following a 5-percent depreciation, pass-through elasticities
rise rapidly as brands’ market share goes from 1 to 5 percent, peak for those brands with a 12-
percent market share, and then decline slightly. Figure 4 shows the opposite pattern: Following a
5-percent appreciation, pass-through elasticities fall rapidly as brands’ market share goes from 1
to 5 percent, are zero for brands with 12-percent market share, and then rise again. Retail-traded
pass-through elasticities do not follow this pattern, however. They remain at or below zero for
those brands with market share greater than 20 percent.
The pass-through elasticities following a depreciation generally resemble those of previous
studies. Goldberg and Knetter (1997) report the literature’s median estimate of pass-through
elasticities to import prices to be 50 percent over the course of one year.13 Knetter (1993)
estimates a 56-percent pass-through to export prices for German ﬁrms exporting beer to the U.S.
market. The model produces median manufacturer-traded pass-through elasticities of 50 and 37
percent, respectively, following a depreciation, for the two German brands in the sample: Beck’s
and St. Pauli Girl. The elasticities are much lower following an appreciation, however, at 3 and
10 percent, respectively.
Tables 11 and 12 decompose the sources of the incomplete transmission of the exchange-rate
shocks to retail prices documented in Tables 9 and 10. The ﬁrst column of each table reports
13As Menon (1995) notes in his survey of the literature, the distribution across studies of these estimates has
thick tails: Researchers have found very dierent pass-through coe!cients even when working with data that cover
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Figure 4: As well as following an appreciation.
34the share of the incomplete transmission that can be attributed to a local-cost component in
manufacturers’ marginal costs. The second column reports the share that can be attributed to
markup adjustment by manufacturers following the shock. The third column reports the share
attributable to a local-cost component in retailers’ marginal costs, and the fourth column the
share attributable to the retailer’s markup adjustment.
Manufacturers’ local-cost component plays the most signiﬁcant role in the incomplete trans-
mission of the original shock to retail prices. Following a 5-percent exchange-rate depreciation, it
is responsible for just over half, or 54 percent, of the observed retail-price inertia. Manufacturer
markup adjustment accounts for 17 percent of the remaining adjustment, while the retailer local-
cost component and markup adjustment account for 20 and 8 percent, respectively. Following
a 5-percent exchange-rate appreciation, the manufacturer local-cost component accounts for 55
percent of the price adjustment, its markup adjustment for 38 percent, the retailer’s local-cost
component for 8 percent, and its markup adjustment for 1 percent. Overall, local-cost compo-
nents account for 74 percent of the observed price inertia following a depreciation and 63 percent
following an appreciation. Firms’ markup adjustment accounts for 26 percent of the observed
price inertia following a depreciation and 37 percent following an appreciation.
To assess the overall welfare eects of this incomplete transmission, Table 13 reports the
equilibrium eects of a 5-percent exchange-rate change on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and on consumer wel-
fare. Following a depreciation, foreign manufacturers suer the most as their proﬁts decline by
5.8 percent. Domestic manufacturers beneﬁt though only marginally: Their proﬁts rise by 0.1
percent. Consumer surplus falls by 4.2 percent and retailer proﬁts by 2.1 percent. Following a
5-percent appreciation, in contrast, the retailer proﬁts basically remain unchanged. Consumers
are somewhat better o than before: Consumer surplus rises by one percent. Foreign manufac-
35turers do quite well: Their proﬁts rise by 4.6 percent. Overall, Table 13 shows that the eects
of a foreign-cost shock are large and unevenly distributed across domestic and foreign ﬁrms and
domestic consumers.
Table 14 considers the possible role of domestic manufacturers in foreign manufacturers’
markup adjustment: It reports the equilibrium eects of 5-percent increase in foreign ﬁrms’ mar-
ginal costs on selected domestic brands’ proﬁts, price-cost markups, and quantities sold. The ﬁrst
two columns give the percent change by brand in manufacturer and retailer proﬁts following the
depreciation. The third column gives the median percent change in the quantity sold by brand,
and the last two columns the median percent change in the manufacturer and retailer markups by
brand. Comparing the ﬁrst two columns of Table 14 to the last three columns gives some indica-
tion of the underlying causes of variation in a brand’s total proﬁts: changes in the quantity sold or
changes in the markup. The results suggest some strategic interaction between import-competing
domestic manufacturers and foreign manufacturers following a depreciation. Import-competing
domestic manufacturers increase their proﬁts by lowering prices to take market share from for-
eign manufacturers. The domestic brands with increased proﬁts are the light or superpremium
brands that compete most directly with imported beers. As Column 1 of Table 14 shows, only
superpremium or light beers’ proﬁts rise signiﬁcantly: Manufacturer and retailer proﬁts rise for
Bud Light by 3 and 6 percent, Michelob Light by 6 and 10 percent, and Miller High Life by 2
and 4 percent. The proﬁts of non-import-competing brands such as Bud, Coors, Old Milwaukee,
or Stroh’s change very little or decline. Premium brands that are not light beers such as Bud and
Coors and sub-premium brands such as Old Milwaukee or Stroh’s are considered poor substitutes
for imported brands and so have little to gain from shrinking markups to try to capture market
share following a depreciation.
36These strategic interactions between domestic and foreign manufacturers provide one possible
explanation for the puzzle of incomplete cross-border transmission. It may not be proﬁt maximiz-
ing for foreign manufacturers to fully pass-through a cost shock in a market where some domestic
manufacturers exploit each increase in a foreign brand’s price to increase their market share.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper makes three contributions. The ﬁrst is an explanation of an approach I ﬁnd useful
to quantify the eect of a foreign shock on domestic consumers and on domestic and foreign
ﬁrms. The approach enables me to ask more and deeper questions about the microeconomics
of international transmission than was possible with previous empirical models. I estimate a
structural econometric model that makes it possible to compute manufacturers’ and retailers’
pass-through of a foreign cost shock without observing wholesale prices or ﬁrms’ marginal costs.
Using the estimated demand system, I conduct counterfactual experiments to determine whether
domestic manufacturers, foreign manufacturers, a domestic retailer, or domestic consumers bear
the cost of the shock. Second, I use an unusually detailed dataset with retail and wholesale prices
that allows me to check the validity of my empirical technique. Third, I quantify the importance
of various sources for the incomplete process of international transmission. To my knowledge, this
paper is the ﬁrst to quantify the relative importance of two factors — non-traded costs and markup
adjustments — for both manufacturers and retailers in the incomplete transmission of shocks to
prices. My results suggest that a local-cost component in manufacturers’ costs explains a large
part of the incomplete transmission though markup adjustments by manufacturers and retailers
play a nontrivial role.
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42Description Mean Median Standard Min Max
Deviation
Retail prices (cents per serving) 71 61 27 27 132
Market share of each product .54 .15 1.16 .00005 9.17
Servings sold 16589 4655 34800 1.83 279,918
Share of Dominick’s beer sales 65.04 65.89 13.96 31.58 98.20
Market share of 34 products 18.46 17.34 7.38 7.01 36.12
Market share of outside good 81.54 82.66 7.38 63.89 93.21
Table 1: Summary statistics for prices, servings sold, and market shares for the 34 products in
the sample. The share of Dominick’s total beer sales refers to the share of revenue of the 34 products
I consider in the total beer sales by the Dominick’s stores in my sample. The market share refers to the
volume share of the product in the potential market which I deﬁne as all beer servings sold at supermarkets
in the zip codes in which one of the Dominick’s stores in my sample is located. Source: Dominick’s.
Description Mean Median Std Minimum Maximum
Percent Alcohol 4.52 4.60 .68 2.41 6.04
Calories 132.18 142.50 23.00 72.00 164.00
Bitterness 2.50 2.10 1.08 1.70 5.80
Maltiness 1.67 1.20 1.52 .60 7.10
Hops (=1 if yes) .12 — — — —
Sulfury/Skunky (=1 if yes) .29 — — — —
Fruity (=1 if yes) .21 — — — —
Floral (=1 if yes) .12 — — — —












































Table 3: Some preliminary descriptive results. Local wages are hourly compensation in local
currency terms for the grocery sector in Illinois. The dependent variable is the retail price for
each brand. Foreign wages are hourly wages in food and beverage manufacturing. The exchange-
rate is the monthly average of the previous month’s spot rate. Feature is a dummy variable that
indicates if the brand was promoted by the store during that month in its weekly circular or in
its display within the store. In the instrumental variables estimation, the instrument is interest
rates in the countries that would eventually make up the Euro area. Source: My calculations.
Retail price OLS OLS








Table 4: An estimation of the share of local nontraded costs in retail beer prices. Local wages
are hourly compensation in local currency terms for the grocery sector in Illinois multiplied by
the exchange rate which is foreign currency units per unit of domestic currency. The dependent
variable is the retail price for each brand multiplied by the exchange rate which is foreign currency
units per unit of domestic currency. The regression also includes brand dummy variables. Source:
My calculations.
44Variable OLS IV
Price -5.62 -5.62 -8.34 -8.32 .




Adjusted U2 .86 .86
Price Exogeneity Test 10.28 10.13
95% Critical Value (3=84) (3=84)
Overidentiﬁcation Test 11.56 11.60
95% Critical Value (45) (45)
First-Stage Results
F-Statistic 17.42 17.40
Partial R2 .98 .97
Instruments wages wages
Table 5: Diagnostic results from the logit model of demand. Dependent variable is oq(Vmw)oq(Vrw).
All four regressions include brand ﬁxed eects. Based on 4080 observations. Huber-White robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Wages denote a measure of hourly compensation from the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics which is described in the text. Advertising is the annual amount spent on advertising
for each brand across all potential media outlets. Sources: Competitive Media Reporting, 1991-1994; My
calculations.




Price -21.743W 1.407 3.157W .280W







Percent Alcohol -1.59W .028 -.143 -.014










M-D Weighted U2 .46
Table 6: Results from the full random-coe!cients model of demand. Based on 4080 observations.
Asymptotically robust standard errors in parentheses. Starred coe!cients are signiﬁcant at the 5-percent
level. Source: My calculations.
Brand Amstel Beck’s Bud Bud L Corona Heineken Miller HL
Amstel -6.06 .0162 .0058 .0075 .0163 .0168 .0054
Beck’s .1437 -5.71 .0528 .0684 .1320 .1356 .0506
Bud .1299 .1359 -6.37 .1560 .1413 .1345 .1511
Bud Light .0977 .1005 .0853 -5.88 .0986 .0992 .0827
Corona .0717 .0673 .0263 .0334 -6.04 .0693 .0261
Heineken .1309 .1236 .0464 .0601 .1276 -6.12 .0453
Miller HL .0843 .0910 .1015 .1041 .0915 .0895 -6.49
Table 7: A sample of median own- and cross-price demand elasticities. Cell entries l, m,w h e r el
indexes row and m column, give the percent change in the market share of brand m given a 1-percent change
in the price of brand l. Each entry reports the median of the elasticities from the 120 markets. Source:
My calculations.
46Product Price Markup
Retail Manufacturer Retailer Vertical
cents cents cents cents
Domestic Brands
Bud Light 53 10 15 25
Coors 49 8 13 22
Keystone Light 35 6 9 16
Michelob Light 59 11 18 28
Miller Genuine Draft 51 9 13 22
Stroh’s 40 7 11 18
All Domestic Brands 49 9 12 21
Foreign Brands
Amstel 99 22 30 52
Beck’s 88 20 28 48
Corona 97 19 29 48
Heineken 99 21 28 49
Molson Light 76 18 28 46
Sapporo 106 24 31 55
All Foreign Brands 100 20 29 50
Table 8: Median retail prices and derived price-cost markups for selected brands. Median across




Amstel 36 19 9
Bass 39 18 2
Beck’s 50 21 36
Corona 66 27 33
Foster’s 29 15 2
Grolsch 5 2 -8
Guinness 53 24 14
Harp 24 11 -4
Heineken 52 26 30
Molson L 31 16 6
Peroni 65 28 33
Sapporo 17 7 -1
St. Pauli 37 18 2
Tecate 28 12 1
All Foreign 35 16 9
Table 9: Counterfactual experiments: median pass-through of a 5-percent increase in foreign
brands’ marginal costs. Median over 120 markets. Retail traded pass-through: the retail price’s percent
change for a given percent change in foreign brands’ marginal costs. Manufacturer traded pass-through:
the wholesale price’s percent change for a given percent change foreign brands’ marginal costs. Retail
nontraded pass-through: the retail price’s percent change for a given percent change in the wholesale price
due to the presence of a local component in costs. Source: My calculations.
48Manufacturer Retail Retail
Traded Nontraded Traded
Amstel 12 7 5
Bass 12 6 9
Beck’s 3 6 -11
Corona -2 0 -8
Foster’s 15 9 10
Grolsch 50 20 21
Guinness -2 -1 2
Harp 26 13 17
Heineken 8 4 -5
Molson L 19 10 11
Peroni -1 1 -7
Sapporo 40 15 15
St. Pauli 10 7 11
Tecate 18 9 15
All Foreign 16 8 7
Table 10: Counterfactual experiments: median pass-through of a 5-percent decrease in foreign
brands’ marginal costs. Median over 120 markets. Retail traded pass-through: the retail price’s percent
change for a given percent change in foreign brands’ marginal costs. Manufacturer traded pass-through:
the wholesale price’s percent change for a given percent change foreign brands’ marginal costs. Retail
nontraded pass-through: the retail price’s percent change for a given percent change in the wholesale price
due to the presence of a local component in costs. Source: My calculations.
49Manufacturer Retail
Nontraded Traded Nontraded Traded
Amstel 54 16 18 11
Bass 51 11 21 16
Beck’s 78 0 45 -23
Corona 74 -23 56 -8
Foster’s 51 22 14 13
Grolsch 46 42 2 10
Guinness 58 -3 34 11
H a r p 4 8 2 51 31 4
Heineken 71 -2 37 -6
M o l s o n L 5 3 2 01 61 1
Peroni 74 -22 55 -7
Sapporo 49 33 10 8
St. Pauli 51 14 19 16
Tecate 50 22 17 11
All Foreign 54 17 20 8
Table 11: Counterfactual experiments: Decomposition of the incomplete transmission of a 5-
percent increase in foreign brands’ marginal costs to ﬁnal-goods prices. Median over 120 markets.
Manufacturer nontraded: the share of the incomplete transmission explained by the presence of a local com-
ponent in manufacturer’s marginal costs. Retail traded: the share of the incomplete transmission explained
by the retailer’s markup adjustment. Manufacturer traded: the share of the incomplete transmission ex-
plained by manufacturers’ markup adjustment. Retail nontraded: the share of the incomplete transmission
explained by the presence of a local component in the retailer’s costs. Source: My calculations.
50Manufacturer Retail
Nontraded Traded Nontraded Traded
Amstel 53 39 6 2
Bass 56 41 7 -3
Beck’s 46 41 -2 15
Corona 47 48 -2 7
Foster’s 57 38 6 -1
G r o l s c h 6 4 - 13 7- 1
Guinness 52 52 -1 -3
Harp 62 27 17 -6
Heineken 49 39 4 8
Molson L 57 34 10 -1
Peroni 47 47 -2 8
Sapporo 60 11 29 0
St. Pauli 57 44 4 -5
Tecate 60 36 11 -8
All Foreign 55 36 8 1
Table 12: Counterfactual experiments: Decomposition of the incomplete transmission of a 5-
percent decrease in foreign brands’ marginal costs to ﬁnal-goods prices. Median over 120 markets.
Manufacturer nontraded: the share of the incomplete transmission explained by the presence of a local com-
ponent in manufacturer’s marginal costs. Retail traded: the share of the incomplete transmission explained
by the retailer’s markup adjustment. Manufacturer traded: the share of the incomplete transmission ex-
plained by manufacturers’ markup adjustment. Retail nontraded: the share of the incomplete transmission
explained by the presence of a local component in the retailer’s costs. Source: My calculations.
Depreciation Appreciation
%%
Retailer Proﬁt -2.10 -.24
Domestic Manufacturer Proﬁt .09 -.07
Foreign Manufacturer Proﬁt -5.83 4.57
Consumer Surplus -4.20 .75
Table 13: Median percent changes in variable proﬁts and consumer surplus following a 5-percent
change in the exchange rate. 4080 observations.
51Product ProﬁtQ u a n t i t y M a r k u p
Manufacturer Retail Manufacturer Retail
Budweiser 0 -2 -2 2 0
Bud Light 3 6 6 -1 -1
Coors -1 -4 -4 3 0
Coors Light 1 0 0 1 0
Michelob Light 6 10 13 -6 -3
Miller High Life 2 4 5 -2 -1
Old Milwaukee -4 -10 -11 8 1
Old Style Classic -3 -7 -8 6 1
Stroh’s -4 -10 -11 9 2
All Domestic Brands 0 -1 -1 2 0
Table 14: Median percent changes in selected domestic brands’ proﬁts, quantities, and markups
after a 5-percent depreciation. Median percent change in proﬁts, quantity sold and in the retail and







Bud Light .1710 4.10
Busch .1464 1.66
Busch Light .0793 1.04
Coors .1598 3.86







Keystone Light -.0143 -.50
Michelob Light .6118 7.63
Miller Genuine Draft .1827 6.31
Miller High Life .0702 2.05
Miller Lite .1925 6.71
Milwaukee’s Best .5678 8.92
Milwaukee’s Best Light .3147 4.37
Molson Golden .1216 .85
Molson Light .1869 1.22
Old Milwaukee -.3186 -7.72
Old Style .2595 3.99
Old Style Classic -.1666 -3.32
Peroni .0001 1.81
Rolling Rock .7274 7.69
Sapporo -.0014 -1.00
Special Export .2750 2.96
St. Pauli -.1472 -3.18
Stroh’s -.0753 -1.11
Tecate .0002 7.21
Table 15: First-stage results for demand. Hourly compensation in local currency
terms for the food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing industries. T-statistics
are based on Huber-White robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the
retail price for each brand in each month and each price zone. The regression also
includes brand dummy variables. 4080 observations. Sources: My calculations;
Foreign Labor Statistics Program, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department
of Labor.Bilateral exchange rate OLS












1vw-stage partial I stat. 44.85
Table 16: First-stage results for the reduced-form pass-through estimation. Lo-
cal wages are hourly compensation in local currency terms for the grocery sector
in Illinois. The dependent variable is the bilateral nominal exchange-rate for
each brand. Foreign wages are hourly wages in food and beverage manufactur-
ing. Feature is a dummy variable that indicates if the brand was promoted by
the store during that month in its weekly circular or in its display within the
store. The instrument is interest rates in the countries that would eventually












Molson Light -5 0
Peroni -16 -8
Sapporo -1 3


















Table 17: Median percent changes in manufacturer and retailer proﬁts after a
5-percent change in the nominal exchange rate. Median percent change in proﬁts
over all markets. 4080 observations.